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I. INTRODUCTION 
The American judiciary is an essential component of the nation's legal 
system. As such, in their role of settling disputes and creating legal 
interpretations and precedents, the courts embody American values, 
history, and culture. Yet, in recent years some legal observers have 
detected among the American people a degree of dissatisfaction with the 
court system. 1 
I. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & HEARST CORP., How THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE 
STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY (1999) [hereinafter HEARST REPORT]. This 
study refers to three earlier empirical studies-1977, 1983, and 1998. The 1977 report 
commissioned by the National Center for State Courts entitled "State Courts: A 
Blueprint for the Future," was "notable for its gloomy picture of the courts' standing 
with the American public, the finding that the public was poorly informed about the 
courts, and its conclusion that 'those having knowledge and experience with the courts 
voiced the greatest dissatisfaction and criticism." Id. at 9. The 1983 report funded by 
the Hearst Foundation, entitled "The American Public, the Media and the Judicial 
System: A National Survey of Public Awareness and Personal Experience," found that 
"Americans were largely ignorant about the legal system, that jury service was 
experienced by only a small proportion of the population and that public opinion about 
the courts was strongly influenced by the mass media." Id. The 1998 report sponsored 
by the American Bar Association, titled "Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System," found 
that relative to former surveys there have been "improvements to the public image of the 
courts, a vastly increased extent of public involvement with the courts and a positive 
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This development has created the need for more empirical information 
about how the court system is perceived. If the American people lose 
confidence in the court system, its role in protecting legal rights and 
creating meaningful and effective public policy could be greatly 
undermined. As Patrick A. Bennack, Jr., President and CEO of the 
Hearst Corporation, noted when comparing the state courts with other 
institutions: "But the courts-that's something different. Here, trust is 
essential. Here, knowledge is essential. Here, society and institution 
come together in ways that really define who we would like to think we 
are as a society-fair, open and protective of the rights of every 
individual."2 
An integral task of the court system is the just resolution of criminal 
cases. It is particularly important to establish a bond of trust between 
lawyers, as competent and ethical service providers, and their clients, as 
consumers who feel they are being served professionally and fairly. 
Without such a bond the criminal justice system cannot function properly 
and efficiently. This vital relationship is thus an area that warrants scrutiny. 
A number of studies have recently attempted to gauge the public's 
perceptions of the court system.3 Other studies have sought to discover 
how criminal defendants perceive aspects of the criminal justice system, 
including their perception of lawyers.4 This Essay, the result of an 
relationship between such involvement and confidence in and satisfaction with the 
courts." Id. The American Bar Association is also considering the foregoing findings 
with others "to develop a national strategy to be pursued for several years in every state 
to strengthen public confidence in the justice system." Philip S. Anderson, Learning to 
Educate the Public, A.B.A. J., July 1999, at 6, 6; see also James Podgers, Confidence 
Game: Bench, Bar Leaders Ponder Strategies to Raise Public Trust in the Courts, 
AB.A. J., July 1999, at 86, 86. 
2. HEARsTREPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
3. Id. at 1. 
4. See, e.g., J0NATIIAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CR!MINAL JusnCE: THE DEFENDANI"S 
PERSPECTIVE (1972) [hereinafter CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE]; JONATHAN D. 
CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE (1978) [hereinafter CASPER, 
CRIMINAL COURTS]; Geoffrey P. Alpert & Donald A. Hicks, Prisoners' Attitudes Toward 
Components of the Legal and Judicial Systems, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 461 (1977); Burton M. 
Atkins & Emily W. Boyle, Prisoner Satisfaction with Defense Counsel, 12 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 427 (1976); Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to 
Court? No, I Had a Public Defender, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 4 (1971); Roy B. 
Flemming, Client Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their Relations with 
Criminal Clients, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 253; Stewart O'Brien et al., The Criminal 
Lawyer: The Defendant's Perspective, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283 (1977); Glen Wilkerson, 
Public Defenders as Their Clients See Them, 1 AM. J. CRIM. L. 141 (1972); see also 
When You Need a Lawyer, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 1996, at 34 (discussing a poll 
conducted of readers and their perceptions of lawyers as service providers, and noting 
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extensive empirical study in the state of Nevada, attempts to ascertain 
factors among criminal defendants that may predict how they perceive a 
level of quality and satisfaction with their lawyers as service providers, 
as well as policy proposals for improving the perceptions of public 
defenders. 
In Part II, this Essay confirms, in line with previous research from 
other locales, that criminal defendants in Nevada who are represented by 
privately retained lawyers are the most satisfied with their legal 
representation. Conversely, defendants who are represented by public 
defenders are the least satisfied. To prove the foregoing, the results of a 
statistical analysis of a survey given to former criminal defendants, now 
inmates in the state's prisons, are presented with a subsequent discussion 
of the outcomes. 
In Part ill, we present research which indicates that public defenders 
are likely to be perceived unfairly and inaccurately by criminal defendants. 
However, a discussion of the literature reveals that public defenders are 
generally as effective and as competent as privately retained lawyers. 
In Part IV, the Essay discusses factors that may signal quality to legal 
consumers that could improve the relationship between public defenders 
and their clients. Moreover, it proposes that a greatly improved professional 
environment can be created between public defenders and their clients, 
which should bolster the perception of the quality of public defenders as 
service providers, even in the absence of traditional consumer signals 
such as price. Adopting these policies will have important public policy 
implications. In particular, with greater trust and confidence convicted 
criminals may decide not to mount expensive appeals based on the 
argument that they were represented by incompetent counsel. 5 That 
alone will help alleviate some of the pressure presently imposed on the 
legal system. 
II. CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AND LA WYER SATISFACTION 
BY LAWYER TYPE 
Criminal defendants' perception of the quality of their lawyer as 
influenced by the type of lawyer representing them, has been the subject of 
a number of articles.6 Generally these studies indicate that criminal 
defendants view public defenders with the lowest level of satisfaction, 
that criminal lawyers were perceived second to last in terms of satisfaction, with divorce 
lawyers ranking last). 
5. David E. Rovella, Unclogging Gideon's Trumpet, NAT'LL.J., Jan. 10, 2000, at 
Al ("By failing to fund the defense at trial, say Messrs. Voth and McDuff, the state [of 
Mississippi] is costing counties more money in later appeals based in part on ineffective-
assistance claims."). 
6. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4. 
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while court appointed lawyers are viewed somewhat more positively and 
the highest level of satisfaction among criminal defendants lies with the 
privately retained attomey.7 
Professor Jonathan Casper conducted the seminal study of how criminal 
defendants perceive the quality and level of satisfaction by attorney type.8 
In research conducted in Connecticut in the early 1970s involving seventy-
one criminal defendants, Casper found that when asked whether their 
attorney was "on [their] side" only 20.4% of those with public defenders 
answered ''yes." Yet those with privately retained attorneys were unanimous 
in their affirmative response to this question. Moreover, a convincing 70% 
of those with legal assistance lawyers, defined as those who also were paid 
by the county but were not public defenders, felt their lawyer was "on 
[their] side."9 Casper found, after carefully interviewing these defendants, 
that a number of reasons, discussed below, were consistently submitted for 
distinguishing among the different kinds of lawyers that typically represent 
criminal defendants. 
A. Criminal Defendant Perceptions of Public 
Defenders as Service Providers 
1. Trust 
The defendants in Casper's study frequently cited a lack of trust for 
public defenders (PDs). In Casper's opinion, the PD's position as a state 
employee contributed above all other factors to the mistrust. 10 Some felt, 
for example, that if PDs receive money from the same source as the 
prosecutor, in this case the state or county, they must logically have 
common interests. 11 
1. See sources cited supra note 4. 
8. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4. 
9. Id. at 105. 
10. Id. at 110. In Nevada, there is a state public defender who supervises deputy 
public defenders in the various counties of the state. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 180.010-110 
(Michie 2001). In addition, counties which exceed 100,000 (Clark and Washoe 
counties) have the authority to create county public defender offices. NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. 260.010-080 (Michie 1995). 
I I. One particularly strong statement concerning the relationship between a 
criminal defense lawyer and his client was made by Abraham S. Blumberg, who dubbed 
this relationship a "confidence game" since the "success of the system is premised upon 
the ability of the defense counsel to perform the role of double agent, to obtain the 
client's confidence, and to convince him that his interests will best be served if he plea 
bargains with the prosecutor." Atkins & Boyle, supra note 4, at 428 n.3 ( citing Abraham 
S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of 
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2. Advancement and Relationship with the "Enemy" 
A second factor that emerged was the belief that PDs are mainly 
motivated by a desire to become prosecutors and eventually judges. 
Therefore they are perceived to be using their posts as PDs to help the 
prosecutors get "more convictions," facilitating their move to what are 
perceived as better paying and more prestigious jobs.12 Moreover, as 
Casper pointed out, the defendants viewed the PDs as part of an overall 
"social system" in which the PD "lives" with the prosecutors and judges. 13 
Thus, the defendant's relationship with the PD is seen as being simply 
transient while the PD' s relationship with the authorities is permanent. 14 
3. Lack of Quid Pro Quo 
The defendants also consistently cited the "importance of money and of 
financial transactions." 15 Casper felt that because of the defendants' 
"general socialization into a market economy,"16 they perceived that the 
"[free] merchandise which they were provided by the state was inferior to 
that available on the open market."17 Conversely, by "paying an attorney, 
[the criminal defendant] can make sure that [the attorney] is [his]."18 PDs, 
on the other hand, have "no financial incentive for fighting hard for [their] 
clients," according to these defendants. 19 
Casper subsequently directed a study of defendant perceptions in 1975. 
Drawing on a sample of 812 interviews in three cities, Phoenix, Detroit and 
Baltimore,2° Casper found similar outcomes to his previous studies.21 He 
reiterated that a defendant's distrust of PDs is often "beyond the control of 
the public defender, for it is the product of defendant norms and values, the 
institutional position of the public defender, and the past experiences of the 
defendant. "22 
a Profession, 1 LAW & Soc'y REv. 15, 24 (1967)). 
12. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 105. This argument, at 
least in Clark County, Nevada, would not be the case, although the perception might still 
exist. In discussions with Clark County PDs it was disclosed that PDs and county 
prosecutors are, in fact, paid about the same and the PDs claim that they don't view their 
positions as stepping stones to become prosecutors, although some PDs have become 
prosecutors. Interview with Gary Lieberman, Linda Bell, Howard Brooks, and Charles 
Cano, Clark County Public Defenders, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Jan. 13, 2000). 
13. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 103. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 112. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 113. 
18. Id. at 112. 
19. Id. at 110. 
20. CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS, supra note 4, at 13. 
21. Id. at 24. 
22. Id. 
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After Casper's work, other researchers discovered similar results. 
O'Brien, Pheterson, Wright, and Hostica, (O'Brien et al.) in a study in 
Western New York involving fifty-five inmates, found that retained 
counsel were perceived the highest when the defendants were asked to 
apply certain "lawyering values" such as "research," "investigates," and 
"talks up in court."23 Assigned counsel scored in the middle and PDs were 
last.24 
In order to understand why the defendants perceived these lawyers 
differently, O'Brien et al. attempted to identify attitudes toward lawyers 
through a factor analysis.25 The strongest factor that emerged was the 
defendants' concern ,vith their relationship with their lawyer.26 
The second strongest factor in O'Brien et al.'s study, much as Casper 
found, was the issue of there being no monetary transaction between 
lawyer and client. These defendants also felt that with no money being 
exchanged, their lawyer (in this case a PD) would not be as interested in 
the case. The third and weaker factor of the three related to the "attorney's 
interest and attempts to gain knowledge about the client and his case."27 
O'Brien et al. concluded that the first and third factors simply do not 
relate to the second variable concerning money. As they pointed out, a 
"defendant's view of 'good' legal services even if received may not 
mean satisfaction with actual representation."28 Rather, as Casper 
likewise discovered, the "defendant believes his attorney would have 
performed better if paid more."29 
Atkins and Boyle conducted a third study concerning criminal defendants' 
satisfaction with legal counsel in South Carolina.30 Atkins and Boyle 
23. O'Brien et al., supra note 4, at 291, 301 tbl.3. 
24. Id. at 301 tbl.3. However, the defendants in this study did rate the PDs higher 
than other lawyers in their ability to "rap with" the client, possibly due to their younger 
ages. Id. at 302--03. 
25. Id. at 303. 
26. Id. at 304. 
21. Id. Variables that loaded onto this factor, such as how much the attorney 
investigated the facts and researched the law, were also variables of which the 
defendants had the least personal knowledge. This factor reinforced O'Brien et al.'s 
contention that unpaid lawyers, such as PDs, are negatively perceived due to cultural 
reasons, not the experience of the inmates. Id. at 305. 
28. Id. at 305. 
29. Id. O'Brien et al. also observed that the variables that the defendants 
considered most important were also those of which the defendants had the least 
knowledge. These variables included, among others, "research of the case," "pull with 
authorities," and "knowledge of the law." Id. at 307. 
30. Atkins & Boyle, supra note 4, at 427. In this study two institutions were 
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focused on objective exchange behavior, such as the number of interviews 
the defendant had with his or her lawyer, whether the defendant received a 
preliminary hearing, whether the defendant was released on bail, whether 
the defendant received advice on his or her plea, the type of plea, and the 
sentence received. These criteria were then related to the type of lawyer 
the defendant had: classified as retained, assigned, or PD. 31 
Their rather surprising result was that the inmates were more than twice 
as likely to be satisfied with the services of the PD.32 Still, the inmates' 
responses did not suggest a positive perception about being represented by 
a PDs. Rather their responses indicated that clients represented by PDs 
were more satisfied because of positive outcomes created by the efforts of 
the PD. The most important of these was the PDs' ability to minimize the 
client's sentence and lessen the length of time to resolve the case. 33 
O'Brien et al. criticized Atkins and Boyle's study, however, arguing that 
they only reported objective, factual information from the inmates that 
resulted in these more satisfactory results. In effect, O'Brien et al. 
contended that, Atkins and Boyle's conclusions were inferred more by the 
authors than actually solicited from the respondents.34 Moreover, Atkins 
and Boyle admitted that there was still inmate mistrust of PDs even though 
the inmates acknowledged that, in some cases, PDs performed well in such 
functions as "minimizing the prison sentences their clients receive."35 
Thus, Atkins and Boyle's results may reinforce O'Brien et al.'s contention 
that defendant "dissatisfaction stems not from what the public defender 
does but who the public defender is."36 In light of the foregoing 
discussion, we specifically hypothesize that: 
H1: There is a difference in the perception of the quality of 
lawyers based on whether the inmate used a public defender. 
B. Defendant Perception of Court Appointed Counsel 
as Service Providers 
As discussed above, Casper found that legal assistance lawyers37 (those 
selected and from them "a stratified random sample was drawn, with each member of the 
1,436 prison population assigned to sampling cells." Id. at 431. 
31. Id. at 432-33. 
32. Id. at 437. It should be noted, however, that nearly all the participants in the 
sample expressed dissatisfaction with their counsel regardless of the type of lawyer who 
represented them. Id. 
33. Id. at 437,445. 
34. O'Brien et al., supra note 4, at 289. 
35. Atkins & Boyle, supra note 4, at 449. 
36. O'Brien et al., supra note 4, at 309. 
37. In Casper's study, legal assistance lawyers worked for New Haven Legal 
Assistance, an organization supported by state and federal funds. These lawyers handled 
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who are not privately retained and are not PDs) were perceived less 
negatively than PDs, although not as positively as privately retained 
lawyers. Similarly, O'Brien et al. encountered the same result when they 
compared what they referred to as assigned counsel, with PDs and 
privately retained attorneys.38 
Casper maintained that legal assistance lawyers, who share some 
characteristics with what this study refers to as court appointed lawyers, were 
perceived more positively than PDs for several reasons. One is that these 
lawyers, unlike the PDs, were chosen instead of being imposed upon the 
defendants.39 Other defendants felt that these lawyers were "more interested 
in them, fought harder for them, [and] were more often on their side.',4o 
Still, in Casper's study not all defendants perceived legal assistance 
lawyers positively. The fact that these lawyers are also free made many of 
the defendants feel "somewhat suspicious of the laW)'er' s concern and 
doubtful whether he is his lawyer's partner or equal.',41 In Casper's view, 
the perception of court appointed lawyers is hampered, much like that of 
PDs, because "[t]he marketplace ethic leads defendants to believe that what 
is free simply cannot be so good as what you must pay for.'' 42 
both civil and criminal matters for indigents at no cost to the clients. See CASPER, 
AMERICAN CRTh1INALJUSTICE, supra note 4, at 118-19. 
38. See O'Brien et al., supra note 4, at 301 tbl.3. O'Brien et al. classified assigned 
counsel as those drawn from a list administered by the Erie County Bar Association's 
Aid to the Indigent Program. Id. at 299 n.33. These lawyers had many specialties 
ranging from real estate to criminal law. Id. Atkins & Boyle did not find court 
appointed lawyers to be a factor, finding them to be "rapidly disappearing" and their 
interaction with criminal defendants to be "episodic." Atkins & Boyle, supra note 4, at 
434. 
39. Nevada Statute 180.050 provides in pertinent part: "The state public defender 
may contract with attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada and with 
county public defenders to provide services required by this chapter if it is impracticable 
for him or his deputies to provide such services for any reason." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
180.050 (Michie 2001). In Nevada, court appointed lawyers are selected from the local 
bar and are paid a flat fee. Court appointed attorneys may earn more if the case becomes 
more complicated and the court approves. Interview with Judge Jack Lehmann, 8th 
Judicial District Court, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Jan. 5, 2000). In addition, Nevada Statute 
260.060, which governs county public defenders, allows that 
[fJor cause, the magistrate or district court judge may, on its own motion or 
upon motion of the public defender or the indigent person, appoint and 
compensate out of county funds an attorney other than, or in addition to, the 
public defender to represent such indigent person at any stage of the 
proceedings or on appeal in accordance with the laws of this state .... 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 260.060 (Michie 1995). 
40. CASPER, AMERICAN CRTh1INAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 120. 
41. Id. at 122. 
42. Id. at 122-23. 
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O'Brien et al.'s finding of why assigned counsel rated in the middle of 
the three, was instructive for several reasons. One was that the assigned 
counsel conveyed a "better image" to the defendants in terms of their 
age; they were seen as being older, wiser, more experienced, and better 
dressed, all of which may signal an appearance of success.43 In O'Brien 
et al.'s study, these lawyers did not work full time for a legal assistance 
program, unlike those in Casper's study, but rather were selected from a 
list administered by the county's bar association. Yet this minor difference 
apparently had little or no bearing on the defendants' perceptions of 
quality. 
The assigned counsel in O'Brien et al.'s study served their clients in a 
manner similar to those in the state in which our study was conducted.44 
The findings regarding the positive influence of age and appearance on 
perceptions of a lawyer's quality thus might be applicable among the 
state's criminal defendants. Likewise, since the state's appointed 
counsel also do not charge defendants for their services, they might, as 
Casper found, also be viewed negatively by the defendants. 
Accordingly, the perceptions of the court appointed lawyers will likely 
not be as favorable as the defendants' perception of the privately 
retained lawyers. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H2: There is a difference in the perception of the quality of 
lawyers based on whether the inmate used a court appointed 
lawyer. 
C. Criminal Defendant Perceptions of Privately Retained 
Lawyers as Service Providers 
The Casper study indicated that privately retained attorneys are viewed 
more positively for most of the same reasons that PDs are perceived 
negatively.45 Private attorneys are chosen and paid for by the defendant, 
therefore they are "yours."46 And because they are yours, they can be 
trusted more and are not part of the social system, in which defendants feel 
the PD is caught. 
O'Brien et al.'s research likewise found that private lawyers were rated 
higher than PDs and appointed counsel. For example, private lawyers were 
43. O'Brien et al., supra note 4, at 302. 
44. Like O'Brien et al.'s study, Nevada court appointed attorneys are selected 
from the local bar and paid a flat fee. See supra note 39. As O'Brien et al. point out, the 
"[a]ssigned counsel are private attorneys drawn from a list administered by the Erie 
County Bar Association's Aid to the Indigent Program .... The attorneys are paid at a 
rate of $10 an hour for out of court work and $15 an hour for in court work." O'Brien et 
al., supra note 4, at 299 n.33. 
45. See supra notes 6-19 and accompanying text. 
46. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 112. 
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clearly viewed as superior in their knowledge of criminal law and in their 
attentiveness to the criminal proceedings. Moreover, they were seen as 
specialists in criminal law, with "extensive experience, contacts and 
skills.',47 Private lawyers were also viewed as being more responsible than 
the other two types because they are paid, were perceived as devoting more 
time to their clients, and were not under the same time pressures as PDs.48 
Hence, we hypothesize that: 
H3 : There is a difference in the perception of the quality of 
lawyers based on whether the inmate used a private attorney. 
D. Research Issues 
In this study we were generally interested in gaining insight into various 
legal system constructs.49 Our primary interests were in Nevada state 
prison inmates' (those who have had contact with the criminal justice 
system at its fullest) perceptions of quality and satisfaction with regard 
to various segments of the judicial system. 50 
47. O'Brien et al., supra note 4, at 300. 
48. Id. These findings should be contrasted with an interview of a judge in Clark 
County, Nevada. In his opinion, there is very little if any difference between privately 
retained lawyers and PDs in terms of the quality of their work. The exception is a few 
extraordinary private attorneys who are well-known in the county, often because of the 
notoriety of their clients and their clients' crimes, and who consequently are very 
expensive to retain. Interview with Judge Jack Lehmann, supra note 39. In fact, Judge 
Lehmann observed that some privately retained lawyers are not as good as PDs, although 
he acknowledged that the very best criminal lawyers are highly paid private attorneys. 
Id. Jonathan Casper refers to "low-level 'courthouse' criminal lawyers [who] hang 
around courthouses offering their services to poor defendants for relatively low fees. 
These attorneys are generally highly exploitative-turning over cases quickly to generate 
their fees." CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 115. 
49. A construct measures a characteristic, in this case criminal defendants' level of 
satisfaction with lawyers as service providers. See, e.g., NARESH K. MALHOTRA Er AL., 
MARKETING REsEARCH: AN APPLIED ORIENTATION 302 (1996). 
50. Other constructs we considered for examination were complaint behavior and 
perception of bias within the criminal justice system. These constructs, involving among 
other things, perceptions of judges, juries, and prosecutors, have been and will continue to 
be the subject of analysis. Robert J. Aalberts et al., Do Race and Gender Influence 
Criminal Defendallts' Satisfaction with Their Lawyers' Services? An Empirical Study of 
Nevada Inmates, NEV. L.J. (forthcoming 2002). The authors, using the same database 
as the study herein, found that women and Hispanics were significantly more satisfied 
than men and other racial and ethnic groups in the quality of their lawyers. Id. 
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E. Methodology 
Initially we contacted the Nevada State Department of Prisons seeking 
approval for a census study of inmates at all state prisons.51 Included in 
the request were the purpose of the study and an initial draft of the 
survey instrument. The Nevada Department of Prisons Social and 
Behavior Committee of the Institutional Review Board subsequently 
approved both the study and the questionnaire. The Human Subjects 
Committee at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas also approved the 
study. 
F. Questionnaire 
Our research team wrote questions to measure the constructs of 
satisfaction (at all levels of the judicial system), quality, bias within the 
system, and complaint behavior. We also drafted demographic questions so 
various groups of inmates could be compared. Then our team pretested 
the survey instrument at one of the state's prisons. Thirty-six volunteer 
inmates participated in the pretest. The thirty-six inmates reflected the 
general population of the prison. There was diversity among inmates in 
terms of race, age, and crimes. The sample groups' crimes ranged from 
drug offenses to white-collar crimes to murder. 
The pretest lasted over four hours, during whic~ time our team asked 
the inmates to complete the survey instrument. Following completion, 
we discussed with the inmates each of the questions in detail, both for 
content and for style. Consequently, many questions were added to the 
survey and many were removed. Our team rewrote nearly every question to 
reflect the language and understanding of the inmate population. 
G. Sample 
Our research team conducted the census of state prisoners in 1997. 
There were nineteen prisons at that time in the state. Of those nineteen 
prisons, two held female prisoners and the rest held males. Our team 
distributed a total of 8188 surveys via the interprison distribution 
system. We counted the surveys and attached appropriate, personalized 
letters of instructions.52 Then, from a central location, our team 
delivered the surveys to the appropriate prisons for distribution to 
inmates. We used the reverse process for the return of completed 
51. A census is the complete enumeration of the elements of a population; in this 
study it was all the inmates in all the prisons in Nevada. A sample, on the other hand, is 
a subgroup of the population selected in a study. See MALHOTRA ET AL., supra note 49, 
at 359. 
52. The team made both English and Spanish versions of the survey available. 
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surveys to our research team. A small percentage of surveys were 
directly returned via mail. 
Instructions were clearly stated for the individuals at each prison who 
were responsible for distributing and collecting surveys to and from the 
prisoners. Each inmate had one night to complete the survey. The 
survey packet included an envelope for them to place the completed 
survey in and then seal. The instructions directed them to return the 
completed survey in the sealed envelope to the guard the next morning. 
Of the 8188 surveys the team distributed, 1867 surveys were complete and 
useable for the study. This represents a credible 22.8% response rate.53 
Due to cost and time limitations there were no follow-up letters or 
incentives given to increase the response rate. Indeed, normal methods 
for increasing response rates, such as monetary incentives, premiums 
and rewards, "foot-in-the-door" techniques, and follow-up letters would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to use with this kind of sample.54 For 
example, initially we stated that a pencil would be provided to each 
inmate but due to security reasons even that small token was not 
allowed. We entered the completed and returned surveys into an SPSS55 
database for further analysis.56 
H. Demographics 
Means and frequencies were used in order to clean the data for each of 
the questions. Means were examined to see if they were in the correct 
range of expected values. Frequency analysis was also used as a way of 
finding incorrect data entries. For example, if the number "66" appeared in 
the data where only values of one to seven should appear, this would 
obviously be in error and would be eliminated. All data entry errors 
were corrected. 
53. Our research team felt the response rate which yielded the large number of 
usable surveys for analyses was very good considering the unique group being 
questioned. In the pretest a number of inmates expressed concern and even paranoia 
about filling out the surveys despite the guarantees of anonymity. 
54. See MALHOTRA ET AL., supra note 49, at 210, for discussion of methods for 
increasing response rates. 
55. SPSS Inc. offers data mining technology for predictive analytics. About SPSS 
/11c., SPSS, at http://www.spss.com/corpinfo/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2002). 
56. For a discussion of the efficacy of SPSS applied to an Analysis of Variance 
(ANOV A), see MALHOTRA ET AL., supra note 49, at 568. 
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I. Factor Analysis 
We ran a factor analysis on SPSS for data reduction and construct 
development. An initial scree test indicated ten factors.57 There were 
ten eigenvalues greater than one on the initial unrotated orthogonal 
factor analysis.58 Orthogonal analysis was run with V ARIMAX rotation 
to determine the best factor solution.59 Based on theory and factor 
loadings, we determined a six factor orthogonal solution to be the best 
fit. 60 Table 1 below reveals the factor loadings (and the seven variables 
which loaded on to this factor) for the construct for this study, "Lawyer 
Satisfaction." The other constructs will not be discussed here but will be 
reported in future studies. 
TABLE 1 
FACTOR LOADINGS FOR THE CONSTRUCT "LA WYER SATISFACTION" 
QUESTION FACTOR 
SCORES 
My lawyer was interested in my case. .721 
My lawyer did everything possible to win. .829 
I could not have asked my lawyer to do more .708 
for me. 
I am satisfied with my lawyer. .869 
My lawyer was the best lawyer for me. .828 
I would use my lawyer again if I need one in .856 
the future. 
I would recommend my lawyer to others. .855 
57. A scree test is a method for extracting factors. MALHOTRA ET AL., supra note 
49, at 652. A factor is an underlying dimension that aids in explaining common variance 
between variables. Factor analysis, unlike ANOV A, does not establish a dependent 
variable and predictor or independent variables, but instead examines a whole set of 
interdependent relationships. See id. at 645; infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
Factors are sometimes termed "latent variables" which, in tum, can "load" on to the 
identified factors. In this study, seven variables loaded on to the factor. See Table 1 
infra for the factor loadings and the seven variables for the construct labeled lawyer 
satisfaction. 
58. An eigenvalue represents the total variance explained by each factor. 
MALHOTRA ET AL., supra note 49, at 534. 
59. The V ARIMAX procedure is the commonly used method for rotating the 
factors in an orthogonal rotation, in which the axes are at right angles. The orthogonal 
rotation identifies the number of variables with high loadings and thus helps in 
interpreting the factors. Id. at 540--41. 
60. A factor loading results in simple correlations between the variables and the 
factors. Id. at 534. 
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The Pearson correlation coefficient between the seven variables in the 
construct "lawyer satisfaction" are all significant with p values equal to 
.000 and an a= .01 .61 The Pearson correlation coefficients range from 
.868 to .460. Reliability of the construct was measured using coefficient 
alpha from SPSS. The coefficient alpha = .9309. Since the factor 
loadings are all above .5 and the correlations between variables are all 
significant and the reliability of the construct is above . 7, we determined 
that it was possible to sum the variables and create a new construct we 
labeled "lawyer satisfaction."62 This new variable will be used to test 
our hypotheses. 
J. Hypothesis Testing 
We completed our hypothesis testing by running Analysis of Variance 
(ANOV A) on SPSS.63 Hypothesis number one was tested by considering 
whether the inmates used a "public defender" as the categorical variable 
and the construct "Lawyer Satisfaction" as the dependent variable. The 
results are provided in Table 2. 
TABLE2 
ANOVA 







64.033 1 64.033 17.865 .000 
GROUPS 
WITIIlN 
5641.735 1574 3.584 
GROUPS 
TOTAL 5705.768 1575 
61. The Pearson correlation coefficient (also called the product moment 
correlation) measures the strength of association between two metric variables (interval 
or ratio scaled). Id. at 469. 
62. Generally a coefficient alpha value of 0.6 or less suggests an unsatisfactory 
internal consistency reliability of a set of items in a construct. Id. at 265. Our study 
arrived at a coefficient alpha of .9309 indicating a strong internal consistency reliability. 
This result signifies a high degree of repeatability of how the sample might respond to 
the questions in the survey. 
63. ANOV A is a test of the means of two or more populations. MALHOTRA Er AL., 
supra note 49, at 443. 
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The specific hypothesis being tested is as follows: 
Ho: µI =µ2 
Ha: µI -::f: µ2 
At an a= .05 level of significance and a p value of .00064 the null 
hypothesis is rejected.65 There is a statistically significant difference 
between the use or non-use of a public defender and the way the inmates 
perceive lawyer satisfaction. The mean for lawyer satisfaction for those 
inmates who used a public defender was 2.31 on an interval scale of one 
to seven. The mean score for those inmates who did not use a public 
defender was 2.78. Those inmates who did not use a public defender 
were more satisfied with their lawyers than those that did. H1 is 
supported. 
Hypothesis number two was tested by examining whether the inmate 
used a "court appointed attorney" as the categorical variable and the 
construct "Lawyer Satisfaction" as the dependent variable. The results 
are provided in Table 3. 
64. A significance level of alpha of .05 or lower is generally considered safe in 
making statistical inferences. This means that the probability is less than .05 that this 
relationship could have occurred by chance. See MALHOTRA ET AL., supra note 49, at 
512. If the p value (sometimes referred to as the observed level of significance) is 
smaller than the significance level (in this case the p value = .000 which is smaller than 
.05) then, as in this case, we can reject the null hypothesis. MARK L. BERENSON & 
DAVID M. LEVINE, STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 368 (1993). 
65. A null hypothesis is used to determine whether a true statistical difference 
exists between two group means. The null hypothesis is that all means are equal. 
Therefore, if a null hypothesis is not rejected there is no true difference between the two 
groups and so therefore no explanatory relationship. See ALVIN C. BURNS & RONALD F. 
BUSH, MARKETING RESEARCH 469 ( 1995). Mark Berenson and David Levine analogize a 
null hypothesis to the American legal system. See BERENSON & LEVINE, supra note 64, 
at 361. They compare it to the principle that an accused criminal is presumed innocent 
until proven guilty. Thus, in statistical analysis, it is assumed the average of the means is 
not different (presumed innocent) unless evidence demonstrates that the average of the 
means has changed. If the average of the means changes and it is proven to be 
statistically significant, then the null hypothesis is rebutted and the alternative hypothesis 
is proven. 
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15.580 1 15.580 4.355 
GROUPS 
WITHIN 
5719.962 1599 3.577 
GROUPS 
TOTAL 5735.542 1600 
The specific hypothesis being tested is as follows: 
Ho: µ1 = µJ, 
Ha: µ1 =/: µJ, 
SIGNIFICANCE 
.037 
At an a = .05 level of sigajficance and a p value of .037 the null 
hypothesis is again rejected.66 There is a statistically significant 
difference between the use or nonuse of a court appointed attorney and 
the way they perceive lawyer satisfaction. The mean for lawyer 
satisfaction for those inmates who used a court appointed attorney was 
2.37 on an interval scale of one to seven. The mean score for those 
inmates who did not use a court appointed attorney was 2.57. Thus, 
those inmates who did not use a court appointed attorney were more 
satisfied with their lawyers than those who did. H2 is supported. 
Hypothesis number three was tested by using whether the inmate used 
a "private attorney" as the categorical variable and the construct 
"Lawyer Satisfaction" as the dependent variable. The results are 
provided in Table 4. 











154.694 1 154.694 43.832 
GROUPS 
WITHIN 
5597.456 1586 3.529 
GROUPS 
TOTAL 5752.150 1587 
The specific hypothesis being tested is as follows: 
Ho: µI= µ2 
Ha: µI-::/= µ2 
SIGNIFICANCE 
.000 
At an a= .05 level of significance and a p value of .000 the null 
hypothesis is rejected.67 There is a statistically significant difference 
between the use or non-use of a private attorney and the way they 
perceive lawyer satisfaction. The mean for lawyer satisfaction for those 
inmates who used a private attorney was 3.01 on an interval scale of one 
to seven. The mean score for those inmates who did not use a private 
attorney was 2.26. Those inmates who used a private attorney were 
more satisfied with their lawyers than those who did not. H3 is 
supported. 
III. PERCEPTION OF SATISFACTION BY LA WYER TYPE: 
IS PERCEPTION REALITY? 
The above discussion suggests that lawyer type may help explain how 
criminal defendants perceive the quality and therefore the level of 
satisfaction they may have with their lawyer. Yet, various studies indicate 
that the type of lawyer a criminal defendant retains does not generally have 
a statistically measurable effect on the outcome of the defendant's case. 
One early study in Arkansas, for instance, involving cases in the six largest 
cities and three smaller towns in that state, yielded no clear evidence that a 
difference exists.68 Another study a year later in Los Angeles County 
67. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
68. Morton Gitelman, The Relative Performance of Appointed and Retained 
Counsel inArka11Sas Felony Cases-An Empirical Study, 24 ARK. L. REv. 442,450 (1971). 
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found that, despite the problems of dealing in a high volume urban 
defender office "[public] defender clients do about as well in the 
sentencing process as the clients who can afford retained counsel."69 
A third study, using a nationwide sample of state grand larceny cases, 
found a more mixed result.70 The author, Stuart Nagel, observed that 
having a private attorney instead of one who was assigned by the court was 
more beneficial for "being released on bail and receiving a suspended 
sentence or probation if found guilty."71 However, a private attorney was 
also more likely "to consume more time while the defendant is in jail 
pending trial, and is more likely to have clients who receive longer prison 
terms if the defendant is imprisoned."72 Nagel also contended that a PD, as 
opposed to a court appointed lawyer, can represent his client at an earlier 
stage, can process the case more quickly, and is better at bargaining for a 
reduced charge and lesser sentence.73 
Atldns and Boyle's research yielded mixed results. On the one hand 
their research indicated that PDs were best at minimizing sentences, but 
that private lawyers, among other things, had more frequent contact with 
their clients.74 
Data in a 1986 study by Roy Flemming in Illinois, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania also suggested that clients, whether they were public 
(represented by a PD) or private, were treated similarly by their attorneys.75 
Factors that emerged as being most important were whether preliminary 
hearings were held, the mean number of motions made per case, and 
whether they had a bench or jury trial.76 
Another commentator, Paul Wice, who observed PDs working in 
criminal courts, also argued that PDs were effective advocates. His study 
indicated that PDs are able to establish important relationships with 
69. Marlene W. Lehtinen & Gerald W. Smith, The Relative Effectiveness of Public 
Defenders and Private Attorneys: A Comparison, 32 NLADA BRIEFCASE 13, 13 (1974). 
70. Stuart S. Nagel, Effects of Alternative Types of Counsel on Criminal Procedure 
Treatment, 48 IND. L.J. 404 (1973). 
71. Id. at 424. 
72. Id. 
13. Id. at 425. 
74. Atkins & Boyle, supra note 4, at 449. The irony of this response is that the 
PD's ability to effectively negotiate a plea bargain which often results in minimizing 
sentences is looked at with disdain by the client who feels that this is part of what 
Abraham Blumberg dubbed a "confidence game." Id. at 428 n.3 (citing Blumberg, supra 
note 11, at 24). 
75. Flemming, supra note 4, at 266. 
16. Id. at 266--67. 
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prosecutors and judges which enables them to greatly benefit their clients.77 
The above indicates that the perception that PDs are not effective 
lawyers is not only erroneous, but may be counterproductive. This may 
warrant changes in public policy. In the following section, a number of 
commentators, as well as the authors offer thoughts for creating better 
perceptions of the services given by PDs. Our hope is that these ideas may 
create policies for improving the relationship between PDs and their 
clients. 
IV. CREATING AN IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC 
DEFENDERS AND THEIR CLIENTS 
Public defenders come to their indigent clients without a price. And as 
long as the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright stands as precedent, 
this strongly embedded constitutional right will not change. 78 Yet research 
indicates that price, as well as advertising, brand, and store reputation, 
consistently signals quality to the consumer.79 Still, it is obvious that none 
of these can be exercised by PDs as cues to how valuable their services 
actually are, at least to the extent that they are employed by consumers in 
the private sector. As the research above indicates, however, price is one 
cue that, due to its absence, greatly diminishes the PD' s ability to curry 
trust with his consumer-the criminal defendant.80 Thus, despite their 
demonstrable competence, PDs engage their clients shorn of their sharpest 
edge-their legitimacy as effective and trusted lawyers. This, in tum, 
impairs the lines of communication essential to a proper defense and 
therefore weakens a major segment of our essential legal system. 
The survey of former criminal defendants, interviews with PDs, and the 
review of studies discussed above lead to a number of recommendations 
that will help resolve the problem this Essay has framed. The accused 
must perceive value in the absence of price and other normal signals of 
quality, before a proper attorney-client relationship can develop. The 
77. See generally PAUL B. WICE, CHAOS IN THE COURTHOUSE: THE INNER 
WORKINGS OF THE URBAN CRIMINAL COURTS ( 1985) (discussing in detail the day-to-day 
happenings in a typical city court). 
78. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
79. See, e.g., Benson P. Shapiro, Price Reliance: Existence and Sources, IO J. 
MARKETING RES. 286, 287 (1973); see also Jaishankar Ganesh et al., Understanding the 
Customer Base of Service Providers: An Examination of the Differences Between 
Switchers and Stayers, 64 J. MARKETING 65, 84-85 (2000); Kent B. Monroe & Albert J. 
Della Bitta, Models for Pricing Decisions, 15 J. MARKETING RES. 413, 417 (1978); 
Richard L. Oliver & Wayne S. DeSarbo, Response Determinants in Satisfaction 
Judgments, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 495, 495-97 (1988); Gerard J. Tellis, Beyond the 
Many Faces of Price: An Integration of Pricing Strategies, 50 J. MARKETING 146, 153 
(1986). 
SO. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19. 
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following sections discuss these policy proposals in an effort to create a 
better environment for PDs and their current and prospective clients. 
A. Education 
O'Brien et al. felt the general public needs to be better educated about 
the criminal justice system in general and the role of PDs in particular. 
This, they suggested, could be accomplished through such venues as 
school classes, clubs, civic organizations, and churches, so that members of 
the public do not "prejudge their attorneys."81 For example, according to 
O'Brien et al., many people, including criminal defendants, expect "Perry 
Mason theatrics in the courtroom."82 However, they contended, the 
"representation a citizen should legitimately expect involves much 
meticulous and less than fascinating hard work that is seldom visible to the 
client."83 
In line with O'Brien et al.'s commentary, our discussions with Clark 
County, Nevada (the state's largest county, in which Las Vegas is located) 
PDs yielded a similar sentiment. One PD we conferred with maintained 
that private attorneys, because they must sell themselves to the defendant 
and to his family, give these parties what they expect. This will often take 
the form of a passionate display of histrionics and other such posturing in 
the courtroom. This kind of behavior is not necessary. For example, in 
preliminary proceedings judges are simply not impressed or influenced by 
such displays.84 PDs, on the other hand, do not feel compelled to feed 
these expectations and therefore may be perceived by their clients as being 
less effective and engaged. 85 As a means of neutralizing this perception, it 
might be productive to explain to the defendants and their families that 
such cues do not necessarily equate with quality work as a criminal lawyer. 
Educating clients on lawyer behavior may thus be quite helpful. 
B. Judge's Behavior 
For defendants to perceive value from their PDs will require, in part, 
some conscientious effort by trial judges. Defendants must see judges as 
conducting the court's business with competent advocates representing the 
81. O'Brien, supra note 4, at 310-11. 
82. Id. at 311. 
83. Id. 
84. Interview with Howard Brooks, Clark County Public Defender, in Las Vegas, 
Nev. (Jan. 13, 2000). 
85. Id. 
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interests of both the prosecutor and the defendant. An illustrative example 
of how a judge's behavior may affect a perception of quality was revealed 
in our conversations with state PDs. One PD remarked that private 
attorneys are given preferential treatment in court by judges who appear to 
value those attorneys' time more.86 This includes calling the private 
lawyers' cases first. Some of these attorneys may also contribute money to 
a judge's campaign, which according to at least one of the PDs, is a 
possible reason for this special treatrnent.87 Moreover, some defendants, 
according to these PDs, are aware of or at least perceive that private 
attorneys possess this advantage.88 To mitigate this, judges should not 
relegate PDs to arguing their motions last, simply because the privately 
paid lawyers may assert that their time is more valuable than that of the 
government paid lawyer. 
Similarly, a PD we interviewed remarked that judges will sometimes 
treat them as interchangeable. For example, if a defendant's original PD 
cannot make it for a hearing, another PD will be asked to appear for her.89 
Clearly, individual PDs, and not just the defender's office, must be 
addressed and treated as indispensable and not interchangeable professionals 
representing the accused. PDs must be treated equally in the order of the 
court's business and the PD's time must be valued. In the current system, a 
very negative perception of PDs and the system in general is created in the 
minds of criminal defendants.90 Policies, on the other hand, which 
diminish or eliminate these practices will likely signal that PDs dispense 
quality work and are competent service providers. Similarly, much like the 
treatment judges should confer on PDs, the prosecutors should be willing 
to demonstrate professionalism in addressing both the PD and the 
defendant. 
C. Public Defender's Behavior 
In line with our previous discussion, Flemming asserted that PDs are 
perceived as lacking legitimacy as lawyers, which creates a disadvantage 
from the very beginning of the relationship.91 Yet private lawyers, 
86. Interview with Linda Bell, Clark County Public Defender, in Las Vegas, Nev. 
(Jan. 13, 2000). 
87. Id. Judges accepting campaign contributions is also one of the most important 
reasons why state judges and the system in general is negatively perceived by the public. 
See HEARST REPORT, supra note 1, at 40-41. 
88. Interview with Linda Bell, supra note 86. Bell's opinion is echoed in the 
HEARST REPORT, supra note 1, at 40-41. In that report 81 % of the respondents agreed 
that "judges' decisions are influenced by political considerations and judges' decisions 
are influenced by the necessity of raising campaign funds." Id. at 40. 
89. Interview with Linda Bell, supra note 86. 
90. Id. 
91. See Flemming, supra note 4, at 273. 
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Flemming argued, gain immediate professional legitimacy for, among 
other factors, the exchange of their services for a fee or retainer.92 To 
overcome this obstacle, he proposed that PDs give their clients "time, frank 
assessments of their situations, and the impression they can be trusted, and 
if the clients respond by listening and offering to cooperate, the attorneys' 
authority takes root in the nascent relationship."93 
Moreover, Flemming contended that some lawyers, including PDs, may 
use a headstrong style that "provoke[s] a client's anger, reawaken[s] 
suspicions, and undermine[s] an attorney's tentative authority."94 Thus, to 
establish a better relationship and therefore legitimacy in the client's eyes, 
he argued that a more "advising" approach should be used with public 
clients, a positive quality typically attributed to successful privately 
retained lawyers.95 This approach, he continued, establishes a ''feeling of 
participation that counteracts client apprehensions about being railroaded by 
an attomey,"96 as well as positions "the burden for decisions on their clients' 
shoulders ... and forestall[s] later complaints about their performance."97 
Another commentator, Glen Wilkinson, has put forward a number of 
ideas on PD behavior, which he felt may counter the criminal defendant's 
negative opinions of PDs.98 Most of his suggestions dealt with altering 
perceptions. He suggested PDs, for example, must appear to be more 
engaged in their cases by having a better visitation policy with their clients 
and taking notes during these visitations.99 Wilkerson also warned PDs 
about appearing too "chummy" with prosecutors and judges since 
defendants are "virtually paranoid" about these relationships. 100 This 
follows Casper's finding about perceptions of the culture of PDs and 
prosecutors in court. IOI 
92. See id. at 263, 273. 
93. Id. at 263. The ability to spend a lot of time with criminal defendants is often 
made more difficult by the circumstances of imprisonment. For example, one attorney 
stated that just getting through all the security checks to see a client can take up a great 
deal of her time. Interview with Gloria Navarro, Attorney at Law, in Las Vegas, Nev. 
(Jan. 14, 2000). 
94. Flemming, supra note 4, at 265. 
95. Id. at 263. 
96. Id. at 266. 
97. Id. 
98. Wilkerson, supra note 4, 151-53. 
99. Id. at 151-52. 
100. Id. at 152-53. 
101. As Casper points out, "the court system is itself a social system. The public 
defender "lives" with prosecutors and judges. He deals with them week in and week out, 
talking with them about cases, bargaining, perhaps socializing." CASPER, AMERICAN 
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O'Brien et al. also found that court appointed lawyers selected from the 
county bar were better perceived for, among other things, how they were 
dressed and their apparent experience. Such factors might instill in the 
client more confidence in the lawyer's abilities. 102 Of course, professionalism 
as a communicator of quality must also be evident in individual PDs. 
Obvious indicators of value, such as professionally suitable grooming and 
dress, are self-evident, but there are more subtle messages in demeanor and 
action. 
Public defenders should not appear rushed. Even given their heavy case 
loads, PDs must make a determined effort to budget time and not only 
listen carefully, but make a conscience appearance of listening, and of 
course, take notes when their clients speak. They should allay the 
commonly held fear of an imminent plea bargain by demonstrating a sound 
knowledge of the law and the criminal justice system, a quality most PDs 
already possess. And just as the judge must do, the PD must also impress 
upon the client that he or she is not represented by an office, but by a 
trained professional or specific team of defenders. 
Just as PDs should avoid the appearance of a chummy relationship with 
prosecutors, they should insist on a professional relationship with their 
clients. This might mean avoiding first name familiarity with the client, 
avoidingjailhouse argot, and not tolerating profanity in conversations. 
D. Public Defender's Accomplishments 
PDs might also impart to their client their professionalism and quality by 
presenting their clients with a resume enumerating their education, 
years of experience as a PD, and other accomplishments. Providing this 
information should subtly communicate that they are defenders by choice, 
trained and often paid as well as prosecutors and other governmental 
professionals, and entitled to equal respect by the court and by the 
defendant. 
PDs, being intelligent professionals, may find that some of the 
foregoing suggestions can be supplemented, revised or rejected. Still, 
the overall basic professional analog is demonstrated by physicians, who 
are invariably pictured in white coats and ties, with stethoscopes around 
their necks, referring to each other respectfully as "doctor." An observer 
simply connects the dots to see a picture of an intelligent, highly trained 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 103. This point of view, however, might be 
contrasted with an interview with a Clark County PD who felt that the close relationship 
that PDs have with prosecutors help them get better deals for their clients, perhaps even 
better than what a privately retained lawyer may be able to get. Interview with Linda 
Bell, supra note 86. 
I 02. O'Brien et al., supra note 4, at 302. 
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professional-a picture that is a communicator of value. But PDs will 
have to do this without the props. 
We submit that these proposals have merit as signals of quality to the 
consumer of criminal legal services. But, as mentioned, some of them 
require more resources than are likely to be forthcoming. As one ACLU 
(American Civil Liberties Union) lawyer recently remarked, "public 
defenders really don't have any viable political constituency."103 
Moreover, O'Brien et al. contended that "[i]ncreasing expenditures on public 
defenders, decreasing their case load, forcing fewer pleas, etc. will not have 
maximal impact on defendants' dissatisfaction with court appointed 
lawyers, since the dissatisfaction stems not from what the public defender 
does but who the public defender is."104 
In the end, promoting policies which might signal that PDs are quality 
service providers may never completely remove the stigma of simply being 
a PD-an employee of the very state which is now aggressively trying to 
imprison his or her client. Still, it might help in diminishing the negative 
perceptions and therefore hopefully decrease appeals based on lawyer 
incompetence. We suggest that these policy proposals, many of which 
have little or no cost to the taxpayer, may be worthy of implementation for 
the overall good of the judicial system. 
E. Future Research Issues 
This study reinforces some of the previous research regarding the views 
of criminal defendants and their satisfaction with lawyers as service 
providers. Central to these results is the negative, yet likely erroneous 
perceptions of PDs as failed service providers. Additional research with 
current and former criminal defendants in how this perception can be 
altered may help the system work more efficiently and economically. The 
practical effect of such research could demonstrate that a criminal 
defendant not only feels a deep cynicism of the court system, but that this 
dissatisfaction results in a higher probability of an appeal of the conviction 
based on ineffective assistance from counsel. The ensuing appeals may 
end up costing the government more in the long run than providing what is 
perceived as adequate counsel. 105 Thus, another possible avenue of future 
103. See Rovella, supra note 5, at Al. 
104. O'Brien et al., supra note 4, at 309. 
105. See Rovella, supra note 5, at A9 ("By failing to fund the defense at trial, say 
Messrs. Voth and McDuff, the state [of Mississippi] is costing counties more money in 
later appeals based in part on ineffective-assistance claims."). 
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research may involve an economic analysis of the cost of implementing 
some or all of these proposals versus the cost savings that may accrue from 
fewer appeals by disgruntled convicts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Understanding the perceptions of the "consumers" of criminal justice 
is of crucial importance if the criminal justice system and the courts in 
general are to operate fairly and efficiently. As Casper stated concerning 
a criminal defendant: "[ w ]hen the government intervenes in his life, it is, 
literally, his life that is involved. Hence, any evaluation of our system, 
any attempt to describe it or change it, must take his views and 
perspective into account." 106 
Edmund Cahn, another observer of the criminal justice system, 
suggested that: "[o]nly when we ... adopt a consumer perspective are 
we able to perceive the practical significance of our institutions, laws, 
and public transactions in terms of their impacts on the lives and homely 
experiences of human beings."107 
This study attempts to gauge the perceptions of criminal defendants as 
consumers of their most important service provider, their lawyers. The 
results demonstrate that perceptions are generally quite negative and 
uneven, according to lawyer type. Even though all the criminal 
defendants found themselves in a very negative environment, those who 
had private attorneys felt significantly better about the quality and 
satisfaction of their lawyers. An arsenal of evidence tells us this is 
unwarranted; good public policy calls for steps to reverse this subjective 
valuation. 
106. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 3. 
107. EDMOND CAHN, THEPREDICAMENTOFDEMOCRATJCMAN 30 (1961). 
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